Предстоящи Събития

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

The question posed in the panel’s title comes at a difficult moment for Europe. On the one hand, we face an aggressive Russia that is waging a conquest war against Ukraine and conducting hostile hybrid activities against other European states. At the same time, a new dynamic is emerging in transatlantic relations, and we cannot ignore developments within Europe that threaten the unity of our alliances.
We must resolve the question of Europe’s defense - which to date has been entrusted to NATO under firm U.S. commitments. We may expect those commitments to be reframed, and I am personally concerned by the prevailing uncertainty and the lack of a serious transatlantic dialogue. Hopefully, many of these issues will become clearer at the upcoming NATO summit in The Hague.
I see several possible models for European defense, each of which raises additional questions:
1. Preserve NATO as Is.
One option, the most preferred one from Europe, would be to keep NATO unchanged, with it remaining the cornerstone of Europe’s defense. Given the policy tilt of the Trump administration, this pure form of the alliance cannot be ruled out, but it seems increasingly unrealistic.
2. Build a Strong European Component within NATO.
Under this model, the European countries would develop a robust defense pillar within NATO, using NATO’s existing structures. European states would shoulder a greater share of the burden, and U.S. commitments - both conventional and nuclear - would be recalibrated. Critical questions here include the scope of U.S. nuclear guarantees to Europe and the extent to which the U.S. will continue to provide key capabilities and staff in allied headquarters.
3. Develop an Autonomous EU Defense.
This would entail forging an independent European defense capability within the EU framework - creating structures and mechanisms akin to those of NATO. It would require significant time, funding, and political will to build the necessary capabilities. Though difficult to realize in the near term, it is justified by deeper European integration and our evolving geostrategic environment. Important issues include how to coordinate with non-EU partners like the United Kingdom and Turkey, and whether all EU member states would participate equally in collective defense or if a subset would form a more tightly integrated core.

4. Form Coalitions of the Willing Outside NATO/EU.
Various ad hoc coalitions formed by willing states outside the formal NATO or EU frameworks could provide tailored military guarantees, for example, to Ukraine. While this option cannot be dismissed outright, it raises the crucial question of security assurances for those countries left outside these coalitions.
There is no clear answer to the question about the European Defense. All formats are possible but all of them rise additional questions. In my view, we urgently need a deep and comprehensive transatlantic dialogue and we must be prepared to invest far more in our collective defense.



CRITICAL OFFSHORE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE VERSUS HYBRID THREATS. HOW CAN WE IMPROVE RESILIENCE



The question is pivotal, as studies show large deposits of natural gas in the Black Sea. Romania and Turkey have announced that they will begin industrial exploitation in the near future, and surveys are being conducted in the Bulgarian economic zone.

What we must bear in mind is that currently in the Black Sea we face many risks. An example of this is freely drifting mines. But there is also an aggressive Russia, which employs hybrid methods against Black Sea states. Thus, when we talk about protecting critical infrastructure in the Black Sea, we must take into account that risks can stem from different sources, most probably there will be a combination of risks. Situations probably will be complex. Moreover, they can extend across areas of responsibility of several countries.
We also have new technologies. The development of new manned and unmanned underwater vehicles makes undersea infrastructure vulnerable to attacks and sabotage, and the deteriorating security environment increases the risk of such attacks.

All this raises several key questions.
First, countries must build resilience at the national level. They need clear rules of engagement, well-trained personnel, and the necessary technical means to act.
In February, I attended Romania’s national exercise for the protection of critical maritime infrastructure. It was very positive that they assessed the adequacy of legislation, the responsible authorities, situational assessment and decision-making, strategic communication, and the joint work of all state institutions and the private sector. This is a very good example of how we should prepare.
Bulgaria must now conduct a solid analysis and improve its system as well. We have discussed scenarios in which it is unclear who should take a coordinating role, how to ensure effective cooperation. But we must act quickly. We cannot proceed as we did before.
The second task shall be to improve cooperation with neighboring countries. As I mentioned, many situations may require action by two or more countries. Consequences can spread across several states. Also, an affected country may request assistance from its neighbor.
How do we act in a crisis situation? Do we send diplomatic notes through foreign ministries, follow the entire bureaucratic-administrative route, or establish rules for immediate action?
This is very important, and we must work more closely together.
There is a good initiative called the Black Sea MCM [Mine Countermeasures]. This is a cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey to combat freely drifting mines. These mines pose a significant risk to maritime infrastructure. This must be our joint commitment. But this initiative is also a good basis for other activities and for bringing in additional countries.
My third point. We need to work more closely with the EU, NATO, and other countries to address risks and threats jointly. As I said, we cannot predict every scenario now, since they may be many, but sharing information, best practices, and building capabilities is very important.
We have to bring together navies, maritime surveillance assets, and private-sector operators to ensure real-time situational awareness and rapid-response capabilities across vulnerable zones. This shall be considered as element of the strengthening of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. 
In today’s deteriorating security environment, protecting critical infrastructure is an integral pillar of deterrence. Let’s not forget that Russia has naval superiority in the Black Sea.
We know that the EU’s Black Sea Strategy, which will be adopted on 28 May, will include sections related to resilience and civil protection. That will also give us additional opportunities.
I would raise the question of having more national and multinational exercises and drills. It would be good to analyze available assets and determine whether it would be necessary to procure additional ones, possibly through joint acquisition, which would reduce the financial burden on each state. 
The issue of hybrid attacks has another feature: they are often difficult to attribute. Cyber-attacks, for example, can be very destructive. Here, broad international cooperation can also be key.
We have good examples of cooperation. As you mentioned, Norway and Germany launched a joint initiative to strengthen NATO’s role in protecting critical undersea infrastructure. Norway has offered to establish a monitoring hub in the High North, while Germany wants to take responsibility for the Baltic Sea. In May 2024, NATO launched the Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI).


 	
СОФИЙСКИ ФОРУМ ЗА СИГУРНОСТ
SOFIA SECURITY FORUM 
www.sofiaforum.bg

С Т А Н О В И Щ Е
На Софийския форум за сигурност

ОТНОСНО: дискусия „Националното измерение на Европейската програма за отбранителна промишленост: интегриран подход между институции, индустрия и наука"


Приветстваме идеята за търсене на възможно най-добрия механизъм взаимодействие между институциите, индустрията и науката в областта на производство на отбранителни продукти. Това напълно съответства на амбициите за модернизиране на Българската армия, така и на Европейския подход за повишаване на отбранителния капацитет на Европа. 
Български фирми и научни звена могат успешно да произвеждат въоръжение, техника и продукти за нуждите на Българската армия, за отделните страни-членки на ЕС и НАТО или да участват в общоевропейски проекти. Особено важно е намирането на възможността български компании да се привлекат в производството на продукти за българската отбрана и сигурност. Това ще позволи част от бюджетните средства да се реализират в страната, както и да се изнася продукция за други страни. Понастоящем общите европейски средства за съвместна разработка и закупуване на въоръжение и техника са относително малки, но амбицията на ЕК е в следващия бюджетен период да има около 100 млрд. евро за такива проекти. Освен това, се очаква европейските държави да увеличат разходите си за отбрана. За 2024 година те са около 326 млрд. евро. 
Общият анализ показва, че все още малко български фирми участват в модернизацията на БА. Малък е и броят на фирмите, които са включени в различни европейски проекти, най-често като част от консорциуми без да имат водеща роля в тях. 
Сериозен проблем представлява непропорционалното разпределение на Европейската отбранителна и технологична база. Основните предприятия, които произвеждат цели отбранителни продукти, които имат и по-голяма стойност, са в страните, чиято промишленост е изградена на базата на НАТО/ЕС стандарти, докато  страните, които са се присъединили към НАТО и ЕС голяма част от продукцията е все още по стандарти на бившия Варшавски договор. Ето защо следва да се настоява пред органите на ЕС за насочване на общи фондове и проекти, които да намалят това неравенство. 
Военното дело навлиза в нова фаза, която води до появата на нови или промяната на значението на съществуващи отбранителни продукти, като безпилотните системи /морски и въздушни/, нови системи за комуникация, изкуствен интелект, роботизирани и автономни системи, новости във военната медицина и други. Все по-мащабното се използват хибридни средства за постигане на военните цели. Всичко това дава основание да се счита, че по-широк брой фирми могат да се включат в производството на продукти за нуждите на отбраната. В националните и европейските програми за модернизация на въоръжените сили следва да се привличат както предприятията от традиционната отбранителната индустрия, така и нови предприятия от гражданския сектор, институти и университети. 
България, както и другите държави-членки на ЕС и НАТО, ще изразходва в идните години сериозен процент от БВП. Приоритет на правителството следва да бъде в две насоки, а именно придобиване на най-нови и ефективни продукти, като в същото време максимална част от бюджета за отбрана се реинвестира в страната, което ще способства за развитие на българската промишленост. От друга страна, със съдействието на държавни органи следва да се подпомагат български предприятия да участват в европейски проекти или проекти на други държави и чрез това да се придобиват нови технологии. 
Подпомагането на български фирми да участват в европейски консорциуми или в създаване на общи предприятия за консолидиране на отбранителното производство в Европа също следва да бъде приоритет на правителството.  
Възможни решения.
1. Да се установи нов подход на взаимодействие между Министерството на отбраната и фирмите, произвеждащи продукти за нуждите на отбраната. Една от възможностите за това е като още на етап планиране на отбранителни способности се провеждат консултации с фирми, които биха могли да участват в производството им. Приоритет да се дава на закупуване на продукти от български производители при условие, че продуктите притежават необходимото качество и ефективност. Това следва да се прилага успоредно с ясни принципи, антикорупционни политики и установяване на конкурентна среда. 
Целесъобразно е този процес на взаимодействие да бъде изведен на ниво заместник-министър на отбраната или заместник-министър на икономиката. 
Като цяло трябва да се установи по-тясно сътрудничество между държавни органи, фирми, научни организации, тинк-танкове и други с оглед на представяне на държавния интерес на различни нива.
Например, Софийският форум за сигурност участва в европейска платформа EDINA – European Defense in a New Age. Анализатори от различни европейски държави изготвят и представят на органи на ЕС позиции по въпроси на отбраната и сигурността. Чрез тази платформа ние изразяваме позиции в интерес на България, но по-тясното сътрудничество с министерства и ведомства ще бъде от взаимна полза. 
2. Процесът на взаимодействие между МО и фирмите би могъл да се подобри ако се създаде единна информационна платформа, която да съдържа информация за необходимите отбранителни продукти, които Министерството на отбраната ще търси, както и данни за българските фирми и техните производства. Съществуването на такава информационна среда може да си използва също и за информиране за възможности по линия на Европейския фонд за отбрана, ЕДА или други инструменти, както и да се координира като цяло участието на български фирми в европейски проекти. Това ще облекчи и процеса на подпомагане на участието в проекти по линия на НАТО и ЕС, тъй като за участие в някои се изисква издаване на документ за подкрепа от МО, сертификати, или осигуряване на финансово участие на държавата.
3. За производство на някои изделия, които са на висока стойност или ще се изисква дългосрочност и значителни бюджетни средства, е възможно да се създаде държавно предприятие, в което да се инвестират целево средства. По този начин ще има реинвестиране на държавни средства, а производството ще остане в страната. 
Също така, целесъобразно е да се оцени възможността за консолидиране под някаква форма на изследователски и научни звена на БАН, държавни университети, Института по отбрана, а възможно и частни компании, за участие в разработване или тестване на отбранителни продукти. Има подобни добри практики в други държави. 
4. Да се даде възможност за финансиране на фирми или отделни проекти за производство на отбранителни продукти чрез Българската банка за развитие. Следва да се отбележи, че Европейската инвестиционна банка започна от 2024 година да отпуска средства за нуждите на отбранителните производства. 
5. Да има информационни кампании, насочени към фирми от гражданското производство, които могат да произвеждат продукти за нуждите на отбраната. Партньори в тези кампании могат да бъдат различните индустриални камари и асоциации. Софийският форум за сигурност си партнира с Българската търговско-промишлена палата за информиране на членовете на палатата за възможностите за участие в различни европейски проекти. 
6. Министерството на отбраната и Министерството на икономиката и индустрията да оценят кои проекти по линия на Европейския фонд за отбрана, ЕДА, ПЕСКО, военната мобилност, проектите на НАТО, различни регионални инициативи и други представляват интерес за страната и да насърчават фирми и организации да участват в тях. 
Оставаме на разположение за бъдещи съвместни дейности и инициативи. 
С уважение,            
                                                                                                         
                                                         Йордан Божилов
                                                             Председател на Софийския форум за сигурност 




Conference on Black Sea Security, Bucharest, Romania, 06 February 2025

Speaking Notes of Mr. Yordan Bozhilov
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The Black Sea holds immense significance for Bulgaria, impacting every aspect of our life—from transportation to culture, economy, and beyond. It is particularly vital for those living in settlements around the sea basin, as their lives are deeply connected to the sea. The Black Sea serves as a hub of economic growth, home to a coastal population that constitutes 10% of Bulgaria's total.
The Bulgarian Black Sea coast is not only a popular tourist destination but also a crucial pillar of our economy. Tourism plays a vital role, while maritime transport is equally significant, with approximately 70% of Bulgaria's transport activities passing through its seaports.
Beyond its economic importance, the Black Sea region is a key link between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Its vast gas reserves and potential for energy connectivity—from south to north and east to west—underscore its strategic significance. The ability to transfer electricity and diversify gas supply routes further enhances its role in regional stability.
Bulgaria, alongside Romania and Türkiye, recognizes the immense potential of the Black Sea and works together to manage risks while seizing opportunities. However, we all understand that without security, the opportunity to develop our economic potential cannot be realized.
First Thesis: The Region is Important for Both the Black Sea Countries and for Europe
Unfortunately, until recently, the region did not attract much attention from the EU and NATO. Bulgaria still lacks a commonly accepted strategy for the Black Sea or a unified assessment of the security situation, largely due to political instability over the past three years. Moreover, political divisions have further complicated the process of forming a cohesive approach.
The war in Ukraine represents the gravest threat—not only to Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity but to the entire region. Russia will continue this war until it reaches its ultimate goals—unless it is stopped.
Russia maintains military superiority in the region, while NATO faces certain capability gaps. Most analysts believe that, at this stage, there is no immediate military threat to Bulgaria or other NATO littoral states, primarily because there is no land border with Russia. However, incidents cannot be ruled out.
Second Thesis: Russia Still Fears a NATO Response but is Unclear About the U.S. Position
At this stage, Russia is unlikely to directly attack NATO countries militarily. Its provocative activities remain below the threshold of NATO’s Article 5. However, this does not mean the risks should be underestimated.
Third Thesis: Russia is Testing Our Reactions, and We Lack a Unified Response
Russia poses significant hybrid threats—not just through disinformation and propaganda but also through a wide range of destabilizing activities. In 2022, Russia attempted to blackmail Bulgaria by halting gas supplies, as 80% of Bulgaria’s gas was imported from Russia at the time. Thanks to allied commitments, Bulgaria successfully adapted.
Another concerning example occurred in 2023, when Russia declared a large portion of Bulgaria’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as a "dangerous zone for navigation" under the pretext of military exercises. This not only disrupted maritime traffic but also obstructed key activities, such as fishing and gas exploration. Bulgaria’s response was limited to sending a diplomatic note to Russia. Such actions clearly contradict international maritime law and violate Bulgaria’s sovereign rights. This issue should have been raised more forcefully in the International Maritime Organization and other forums, as it could set a dangerous precedent worldwide.
Furthermore, Russia’s activities, such as jamming or distorting GPS signals, pose a threat to transport and other sectors. Russia is gradually testing our reactions, much like boiling a frog slowly. These activities remain below the NATO Article 5 threshold, making it crucial to establish a coordinated and decisive response.
Fourth Thesis: The Black Sea Concentrates Many and Various Risks
•	Floating Mines: These not only pose a risk to ships but also increase insurance costs for vessels, raising overall service prices. Many shipowners avoid deploying new ships in the Black Sea, relying only on older vessels, which adds additional risks. Cruise liners, in particular, are avoiding Black Sea ports altogether.
•	Environmental Issues: Oil spills, sunken ships, and other ecological threats pose long-term risks to regional stability and safety.
All these risks—combined with Russia’s aggressive behavior—demand greater attention from NATO and the EU. Countering Russian aggression and addressing these security challenges require the deployment of additional joint military capabilities and national capacity-building efforts.
Russia’s actions must be exposed in international organizations, as they could set a dangerous precedent for global security.
Fifth Thesis: The Risk of Weapons Leaving the Battlefield Must Be Addressed
There is a serious risk of weapons from the conflict in Ukraine falling into the hands of criminal groups and terrorists. The possibility of such weapons being used in hybrid activities by Russian or pro-Russian forces cannot be ignored.
Understanding the Interests of Key Players in the Region
Russia’s Objectives:
1.	Russia considers the Black Sea-Balkan region crucial to its strategic interests and will strive at all costs to retain occupied territories, particularly in Ukraine. If necessary, it may seek to seize the entire Ukrainian coastline before any peace agreement or truce is reached.
2.	Russia aims to undermine NATO and EU unity, primarily through hybrid operations targeting individual member states. The Black Sea has become a focal point for these efforts.
3.	Moldova and Georgia are particularly vulnerable to Russian influence.
4.	Russia may seek to halt or freeze the war in exchange for sanctions relief while retaining its occupied territories. However, this would not mean abandoning its ultimate goal of subjugating Ukraine.
5.	For Russia, everything is a single battlefield—it pursues its objectives across different territories and at different times.
United States Position:
1.	The U.S. is focused on reaching a strategic deal and assessing its outcomes.
2.	Ukraine is not a core U.S. national interest, though Washington remains committed to supporting it.
3.	Former President Trump, if reelected, would likely oppose deploying American troops to European soil.
4.	The U.S. may seek to distance Russia from China and Iran, particularly if Iran becomes the next major foreign policy focus.
European Perspectives and the Need for a Unified NATO-EU Response
Different European countries have varying attitudes toward the region. While France and Italy maintain a presence, others seem largely disengaged.
NATO and the EU must avoid focusing solely on specific regions, such as the Baltics, and instead take a comprehensive view of Russia’s actions. For Moscow, every front is interconnected—it determines when, where, and how to advance its interests.
Russia’s objectives within NATO and the EU remain purely destructive, regardless of how they are pursued. As such, Brussels must swiftly develop a unified position with clear, actionable measures to strengthen security in the Black Sea. This is particularly critical for the EU.
Finally, Russia’s influence over our societies through internal actors poses a significant challenge. Addressing this issue requires collective awareness, resilience, and decisive action.
Thank you.



SECURITY RISKS AND CHALLENGES IN THE BLACK SEA REGION

In the light of the developments caused by the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the strategic value of the Black Sea region acquires a renewed and more consistent relevance. Given these circumstances, it is high time for a strategic EU approach to the Black Sea, which should aim at a more coordinated response to the threats and challenges in the wider region.
The region is important for the EU from many perspectives. Just to mention some: Enlargement policies, energy and energy security, environmental policies and dealing with environmental risks, transport, tourism, and others.
There are important underwater communications. Black sea is important for the global food security.
It is important from the point of view of the future of the European security architecture, and also with the global legal order. Everyone is looking at how the war is developing, what are the actions of NATO and the EU in addressing Russia's war against Ukraine. This is also important for the determination of the global South. This has implications for the future settlement of the world.
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Security issues are now prevalent in the region. The Black Sea region represents an extremely complex and complicated security environment. 
1. Russia's war against Ukraine is the biggest threat to regional and European peace and security. The war can still take on different dimensions and it is not clear when and how it will end. Russia has the potential to fight a long war.
I don't think Ukraine was Putin's ultimate goal. He thinks in other categories. Since his power in Russia is unlimited and unchallenged, he himself determines the future of the country according to his vision.
His views raising Russia as a global player, and tries to restore a mini USSR, creating zones of influence.
Russia has military superiority in the Black Sea, while other countries have deficits and cannot be overcome at sea due to Turkey's position on the straits.
NATO is strengthening the eastern flank by deploying land forces.

2. New problems associated with the war
- Thousands of incidents of air, water and land pollution and the degradation of ecosystems have already been identified. They affect not only Ukraine but also the neighboring countries.
- Explosions of ammunitions are associated with spread of toxic gases and particles. 
- Fires in forested areas cause damaging the entire ecosystem. 
- The weapons used during this war will raise the carbon footprint in the region.
- Multiple industrial facilities, warehouses and factories have been damaged, some storing a range of hazardous substances.
- Air pollution and potentially serious contamination of ground and surface waters is a huge problem. Russia is targeting also Ukraine’s water infrastructure, including pumping stations and purification plants.
- Large volumes of military waste, including destroyed military vehicles, creates a major clean-up challenge.
- The use of explosive weapons in populated areas also creates pollution from building materials including asbestos, metals, and combustion products. 
 - On the first day of the invasion, gamma radiation in the Chernobyl zone was reported to be approximately 28 times the annual limit. It was the result of heavy vehicle movements.
- There are many outdated coal mines in the Donbas region. And these mines pose a huge danger in Ukraine. Because when a mine is shut down it cannot be abandoned for good.
- Huge amount of land mines are planted on the Ukrainian territory.
- Blocking Ukraine's exports
- Blocking by Russia of the EEZ of the Black Sea countries /Bulgaria/.
- Free floating sea mines. 
- Millions of refugees and internally displaced persons.
- Devastated Ukrainian economy, destroyed houses and infrastructure. 

3. Besides the war, there are many other problems.
States are very heterogeneous in their constitution, interests and strategic goals.
- Old unresolved issues/conflicts – Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
- Slow progress by countries to modernize their democracies, societies and economies. Weak economies, weak democracies. Russia has mechanisms to influence internal processes.
- Turkey is a special player. Turkey takes the role of custodian of the  Montreux Convention and doesn’t allow entrance of military vessels of non-littoral states. NATO will have deficits in the naval domain. 


4. Russia is ready to escalate.
Russia can use all these vulnerabilities to its advantage.
Russia has influence over old and new risks and can use them to its advantage. Russia has military superiority in the Black Sea region.

Russia will continue using all sorts of malicious influences on our countries for years, like disinformation, propaganda, cyber-attacks.
Nationalism, populism, anti-democracy, anti-EU - all these are parties that are ideologically close to the Kremlin.

Russia may try to challenge NATO unity through limited aggression against a NATO state. Will the country itself invoke Article 5 and will others risk nuclear war?
The Black Sea is the most vulnerable region now for aggression and provocations against the EU and NATO. Because of the overlap of different risks, because of the weakness of democracies in different countries, because of different interests and especially because of the revisionist Russia. We must be ready to respond. We must have a good analysis and predictions about possible provocations. Let's be ready for a collective response.
It is necessary to have a better knowledge of the region and the ongoing processes. Obviously, there are different EU policies that are intertwined in the region, but how do we have a common approach? Is an approach like RAN possible? To cover many things in a single approach, research and policy proposals?
Many analysts believe that the EU should develop its own long-term strategy for Russia.



Ladies and Gentlemen, 
Today’s discussion is dedicated to the Black Sea region. I remember 20 years ago, when I would come to this building as a representative of the Republic of Bulgaria to meet with representatives of all Black Sea countries to exchange information about the armed forces and exercises in the Black Sea and extend invitations for port visits within the framework of the regional security architecture. This was the spirit of positivism and cooperation, the time for new initiatives for peace and partnership. All our speeches would start with the optimism for the future of the Black Sea region as a crossroads between continents, cultures and economies. This positivism faded in 2008 following the Russian invasion in Georgia and completely disappeared in 2014 after the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the military venture in Eastern Ukraine. 
Today full-scale war is back on the continent of Europe. The war Russia is waging against Ukraine brings suffering and destruction not only to the Ukrainian people, but is a blow to the entire system of international relations. It shatters all efforts in the post-World War II period of seeing Europe peaceful and free. A Europe of free peoples that choose their own paths for development or organisations to be part of. 
Despite the Russian disinformation and propaganda, despite the efforts to misrepresent or to paint Ukraine or other states as responsible, we have a touchstone for this war. In periods of such trials, we turn to the wisdom embodied in the philosophical understanding of human nature in the works of the renowned philosophers of our time. One such is Tsvetan Todorov, a Bulgarian and French philosopher, who grew up in Bulgaria but worked in France - one of the founders of contemporary critical humanism. 
Humanism considers human well-being as the ultimate goal of all public actions. Tsvetan Todorov firmly believes that the end does not justify the means, especially if war is the means. Tsvetan Todorov sees another reason for wars. As he puts it: “Power needs no explanation outside of itself; it is an end, not just a means.” He is in line with the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, according to whom “War itself requires no particular motivation; indeed, the desire for glory inspires men to it.” Deep down, I doubt that Russia's war of aggression, will bring Russia any particular glory. As a representative of the humanism Tsvetan Todorov rejects the aggressive war as inhuman.
We pledge solidarity with the Ukrainian people, who are fighting for their nature to be Ukrainian people and not to be formatted according to the image the Kremlin devises for them. This is a fight for the principle of freedom. Because war is not only war for territory. Territory must be respected. This is a key aspect of international relations; however, it is for the people in the territories, about their future. What is unacceptable is not only breaching the borders but also the submission of the population, forceful deportation, castigating people and inflicting unbearable suffering on civilians. 
The Russian war of aggression tests not only Ukraine and its people, but it is also an attack on the security and perspectives for development of the Black Sea region. The region is vital for Bulgaria and other regional countries. In our interest is building security, stability, prosperity and resilience against territorial and economic threats in the Black Sea region. The Black Sea has a great potential as an important transport, energy and economic corridor that provides connectivity between Europe and Asia. This potential is seriously impaired today. 
The importance of the Black Sea transcends the regional aspect. In the context of Russia's war against Ukraine, the geostrategic importance of the region is clearly seen. We have witnessed how Russia's blocking of Ukrainian grain exports had negative impact on the global food security. Stability and security of the region is directly linked to the stability and security in Europe. 
The Black Sea is one of the regions where Russia projects military force against freedom and democracy to impose its vision of a new world order. The events of the past year have confirmed that Russia is using all means at its disposal to maintain its sphere of influence in the region.
Russia’s military buildup in the Black Sea created significant imbalance in the military powers in the region in favor of Russia, which is a matter of serious concern for the other littoral states. Russia is expanding its control over the northwestern Black Sea basin, adjacent to the territorial waters of other riparian states, where it imposes restrictions on economic activities, poses direct challenges to maritime transport and impedes the freedom of navigation.
Obviously, we are facing complex security environment in the Black Sea region, combination of military and hybrid threats. We shall not forget the frozen conflicts or vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure. In this context it is necessary to look for broader approaches to solving security issues in the region, as they have implications going far beyond the regional dimension.
Thank you for your attention.


Брифове

ТРАНСАТЛАНТИЧЕСКИТЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ

КРИТИЧНА МОРСКА ЕНЕРГИЙНА ИНФРАСТРУКТУРА СРЕЩУ ХИБРИДНИ ЗАПЛАХИ. КАК МОЖЕМ ДА ПОДОБРИМ УСТОЙЧИВОСТТА

НАЦИОНАЛНОТО ИЗМЕРЕНИЕ НА ЕВРОПЕЙСКАТА ПРОГРАМА ЗА ОТБРАНИТЕЛНА ПРОМИШЛЕНОСТ

ЗА ВАЖНОСТТА НА ЧЕРНО МОРЕ

РИСКОВЕТЕ И ПРЕДИЗВИКАТЕЛСТВАТА ПРЕД СИГУРНОСТТА В ЧЕРНОМОРСКИЯ РЕГИОН

ЗА ДЕФИНИРАНЕТО НА ЧЕРНОМОРСКАТА СИГУРНОСТ