CRITICAL OFFSHORE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE VERSUS HYBRID THREATS. HOW CAN WE IMPROVE RESILIENCE

CRITICAL OFFSHORE ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE VERSUS HYBRID THREATS. HOW CAN WE IMPROVE RESILIENCE The question is pivotal, as studies show large deposits of natural gas in the Black Sea. Romania and Turkey have announced that they will begin industrial exploitation in the near future, and surveys are being conducted in the Bulgarian economic zone. What we must bear in mind is that currently in the Black Sea we face many risks. An example of this is freely drifting mines. But there is also an aggressive Russia, which employs hybrid methods against Black Sea states. Thus, when we talk about protecting critical infrastructure in the Black Sea, we must take into account that risks can stem from different sources, most probably there will be a combination of risks. Situations probably will be complex. Moreover, they can extend across areas of responsibility of several countries. We also have new technologies. The development of new manned and unmanned underwater vehicles makes undersea infrastructure vulnerable to attacks and sabotage, and the deteriorating security environment increases the risk of such attacks. All this raises several key questions. First, countries must build resilience at the national level. They need clear rules of engagement, well-trained personnel, and the necessary technical means to act. In February, I attended Romania’s national exercise for the protection of critical maritime infrastructure. It was very positive that they assessed the adequacy of legislation, the responsible authorities, situational assessment and decision-making, strategic communication, and the joint work of all state institutions and the private sector. This is a very good example of how we should prepare. Bulgaria must now conduct a solid analysis and improve its system as well. We have discussed scenarios in which it is unclear who should take a coordinating role, how to ensure effective cooperation. But we must act quickly. We cannot proceed as we did before. The second task shall be to improve cooperation with neighboring countries. As I mentioned, many situations may require action by two or more countries. Consequences can spread across several states. Also, an affected country may request assistance from its neighbor. How do we act in a crisis situation? Do we send diplomatic notes through foreign ministries, follow the entire bureaucratic-administrative route, or establish rules for immediate action? This is very important, and we must work more closely together. There is a good initiative called the Black Sea MCM [Mine Countermeasures]. This is a cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey to combat freely drifting mines. These mines pose a significant risk to maritime infrastructure. This must be our joint commitment. But this initiative is also a good basis for other activities and for bringing in additional countries. My third point. We need to work more closely with the EU, NATO, and other countries to address risks and threats jointly. As I said, we cannot predict every scenario now, since they may be many, but sharing information, best practices, and building capabilities is very important. We have to bring together navies, maritime surveillance assets, and private-sector operators to ensure real-time situational awareness and rapid-response capabilities across vulnerable zones. This shall be considered as element of the strengthening of NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. In today’s deteriorating security environment, protecting critical infrastructure is an integral pillar of deterrence. Let’s not forget that Russia has naval superiority in the Black Sea. We know that the EU’s Black Sea Strategy, which will be adopted on 28 May, will include sections related to resilience and civil protection. That will also give us additional opportunities. I would raise the question of having more national and multinational exercises and drills. It would be good to analyze available assets and determine whether it would be necessary to procure additional ones, possibly through joint acquisition, which would reduce the financial burden on each state. The issue of hybrid attacks has another feature: they are often difficult to attribute. Cyber-attacks, for example, can be very destructive. Here, broad international cooperation can also be key. We have good examples of cooperation. As you mentioned, Norway and Germany launched a joint initiative to strengthen NATO’s role in protecting critical undersea infrastructure. Norway has offered to establish a monitoring hub in the High North, while Germany wants to take responsibility for the Baltic Sea. In May 2024, NATO launched the Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI).